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Abstract—After phishing message detection, determining the
provenance of phishing messages and websites is the second step
to tracing cybercriminals. In this paper, we present a novel
method to cluster phishing emails automatically using ortho-
graphic features. In particular, we develop an algorithm to cluster
documents and remove redundant features at the same time.
After collecting all the possible features based on observation,
we adapt the modified global k-mean method repeatedly, and
generate the objective function values over a range of tolerance
values across different subsets of features. Finally, we identify
the appropriate clusters based on studying the distribution of
the objective function values. Experimental evaluation of a large
number of computations demonstrates that our clustering and
feature selection techniques are highly effective and achieve
reliable results.
Index Terms—Clustering, feature selection, feature elimination,
modified global k-means
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing is a criminal activity using social engineering
techniques to fraudulently acquire personal information, such
as credit card and bank details or passwords. In a typical
phishing attack, the phishers send a large number of malicious
emails that pretend to come from a legitimate organisation,
typically a financial institution such as a bank or insurance
company. The emails often urge the users to update their
personal information in a fake or spoofed website which was
created to be almost identical to the legitimate organization’s
website so that the phishers may steal the identities of the
users via the website. Once this information is acquired, the
phishers may use a person’s details to create fake accounts in
a victim’s name, ruin a victim’s credit, or even prevent victims
from accessing their own accounts.
A study by academics at Harvard and Berkeley universities
reported in The Register, reveal that 23% of users only look at
the content of sites when deciding whether they are legitimate.
A survey of Gartner [14] on phishing attacks shows that
approximately 3.6 million users in the United States suffered
losses caused by phishing, totalling approximately US$3.2
billion. Especially, the number of individual victims rose from
2.3 million in 2006 to 3.6 million in 2007, which is a 56.5%
increase.
The damage caused by phishing ranges from loss of access
to email to substantial financial loss. This style of identity
theft is becoming more popular, because of the ease with
which unsuspecting people often divulge personal information
to phishers, including credit card numbers, passwords, and so
on. There are also fears that identity thieves can obtain some
such information simply by accessing public records. Phishing
has become more and more complicated and sophisticated so
that phishers can bypass the filter set by current anti-phishing
techniques and cast their bait to customers and organizations.
According to the report of the Anti-Phishing Working Group
[12] the longest time for a phishing site to exist is thirty-one
days, and the average time online for a phishing site is shorter
than five days. Phishers may use different URLs at different
times. This introduces the issue of how to forensically identify
the provenance of phishing emails, i.e., how to determine
whether phishing emails and their associated websites come
from the same group, if the URLs are not the same. One
possible solution is to cluster or group the emails.
Clustering is typically implemented as fully automated,
unsupervised learning algorithms and similar ones are grouped
whilst different ones find different groups. The algorithm is
usually given input documents and features selected [5], [17].
However, recently researchers have focused on allowing a
user to provide limited information (i.e. text feature) to im-
prove clustering quality. As in traditional information retrieval,
these clustering approaches focus on text clustering, input
information consists of text features. For example, users may
supply a few keywords per cluster and a class hierarchy to
generate preliminary labels to create an initial text classifier for
the cluster [4], [15], [16]. Although additional input involves
background knowledge to enrich the set of features that
describe each document [11] such as ontology, orthographic
features have rarely been considered (refer to Section III for
a definition).
Most phishing emails are largely similar in wording, espe-
cially the most important terms, such as “security”, “expire”,
“unauthorized”, “account”, “login” and so on. Such terms are
useful to classify if an email is a phishing email, however, this
content may not be so helpful in determining the provenance
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of the email. This important next step in the forensic process
requires an analysis of other features which may uniquely
identify a particular group’s style.
Since the semantic terms are largely similar in such doc-
uments, the orthographic features may differentiate between
emails better. For example, phishers often intend to lure
customers in different ways. They may redirect the customers
to a website, require the customers to login using a form, create
invisible links which the customers may click on accidently.
There are many different such styles (orthographic features) in
each document. Orthographic features are styles that are used
to describe presentation of segments in documents including
lexical, syntactic, structural and content features (details refer
to Section III). This paper presents work on clustering phish-
ing emails using orthographic features, with the hypothesis
that such features are the most effective in identifying the
provenance of such messages. The experiment in Section V
shows that orthographic features are good discriminators in
clustering the same type of documents.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
places our work in the context of existing work in anti-phishing
and text clustering; Section III gives the details of feature
collection; Section IV considers how to select features and
identify clusters; Section V provides experimental results on
the effectiveness of the clustering; Section VI is the conclusion
which summarises the work and directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Text clustering is useful, since it enables us to group
documents automatically without any prior knowledge and
supervision. There has been a lot of work in the information
retrieval and machine learning communities on the problem
of text clustering. Various methodologies have recently been
developed for document classification and representation to
assist in anti-phishing [10], [18], [19], [21], [25], [29], [22],
[23], [20].
A. Anti-phishing methods
There are only a few research efforts that focus entirely on
tackling the problem of phishing attacks. Also, most of the
existing work focuses on the techniques to predict whether
an email is malicious [7], [10], [18], [19], [21], [1]. Suspect
emails are signed as “spam” email and the users are protected
from accessing emails. This type of solution falls in the
problem of text classification which classifies emails to two
categories: normal emails or phishing emails.
AntiPhish [18] is a browser extension which is used to
protect inexperienced users against spoofed web site-based
phishing attacks. AntiPhish is a plug-in tool which keeps track
of users’ sensitive information and prevents this information
from being passed to a web site that is considered as untrusted.
A text classification algorithm is responsible for identifying
whether a web site is a phishing site based on addresses used
in a form. In detail, it compares a legitimate URL and IP
address with URL the page actually locates. AntiPhish focuses
more on tracking sensitive information provided by a user.
In contrast, [29] identified a website as a suspect phishing
site when the visual similarity value is above a pre-defined
threshold.
Another widely-deployed technique is based on using a
blacklist of phishing domains to force the browser to refuse
to visit, such as PwdHash [6], [25] and SpoofGuard [25],
[26] by Stanford University. However, it is currently unclear
how effective such blacklisting approaches are in mitigating
phishing attacks in reality, given the use of FastFlux and other
technologies to rapidly change hosting locations.
There are many existing machine methods for text classifica-
tion, such as the decision tree used by [21]. Text classification
aims to automatically categorise text documents into pre-
defined classes or types based on their contents [28]. However,
when dealing with phishing there are a priori no identified
classes. However, fewer researchers work on identified phish-
ing emails.
B. Traditional clustering methods
The use of machine learning techniques to iterate fea-
ture selection has received more and more attention. Early
approaches have been developed on supervised learning for
either dimensionality reduction or increasing feature quality,
such as feature selection in text classification. Since informa-
tion available on the web is more and more complicated and
has increased dramatically, the need for unsupervised learning
has risen.
Roth, et. al [27] developed a system to implement a wrapper
strategy of feature selection for text clustering. The features
are directly selected by optimizing the discriminative power
of the partitioning algorithm used. However, the experiment
only resulted in clustering two clusters which is not suitable
to implement multiple clusters. Also, it could be considered
as a text classification problem which is supervised.
Dash and Liu [8], [9] selected features based on a ranking
algorithm. All the features firstly are ranked based on the
importance of clustering using entropy-based ranking measure.
Then the features are added into the cluster one by one from
the most important feature to the least important one. When
the effectiveness of the cluster does not increase, the selection
ends by the values of the objective function. An assumption
here is that the ranking process must be correct, therefore,
important features may be ignored when the ranking process
is not reliable.
C. Problems and solutions in this paper
The problem and solution presented in this paper differ from
existing systems as follows:
1) Application domain: Most existing systems work on
identifying phishing emails, while we aim to cluster
emails which were already identified as phishing emails
by their origin.
2) Feature space: Phisher emails are largely similar in
content. Therefore, we believe that the orthographic
features may be more informative than the semantic
Fig. 1. Commonwealth Phishing Emails 18 May 2006
features in such application. The work presented in this
paper focuses on orthographic features.
3) Feature elimination and selection: The quality of fea-
tures used in clustering determines greatly the effective-
ness of a cluster. We design and implement a novel al-
gorithm that adapts the modified global k-mean method
and largely evaluates the objective function values across
different subsets of features. This algorithm reinforces
the clustering by eliminating “noisy” features so that
only good features are selected.
4) Cluster effectiveness: Clustering is an unsupervised
learning process so that it is not easy to judge whether a
cluster is appropriate. We develop a method to identify
clusters by analysing a large number of figures which
indicate the relationship among objective function val-
ues, tolerance values and number of clusters based on
features of various level and subset. From the analysing,
we are able to identify confident clusters.
III. DOCUMENT PRESENTATION
The standard document representation used in clustering is
the vector space model [24]. In this model, each document is
represented by a vector of (term, value) pairs observed in the
document. Then a collection of a document can be represented
as a set of document vectors or a matrix.
A. Feature collection and definition
A phishing email usually contains multimedia information,
including image and text, where the text information may
contain plain text, HTML, URLs, scripts, styles and so on.
However, the information cannot be recognized by a system
directly, rather it needs to be characterized according to the
needs of the system.
As discussed in Section II, phishing emails are largely
similar in content. Therefore, we believe that orthographic
features are more informative than the semantic features in
such an application. The orthographic features mainly consist
of style characteristics that are used to convey the role of
words, sentence or section and other useful description of the
content. They are defined manually based on observation.
Since an email body is often loose in structure, parsing
email content is more difficult than parsing the heading part
of the email. The work presented in this paper focuses on the
orthographic structure of the email content.
The basic orthographic features that are considered include
HTML features, size of document and other elements. The
original orthographic features collected in our system are
described as following:
1) size of email: size of text body and html body of an
email.
2) text content: whether an email has content 1.
3) vlinks: number of visible links in an email.
4) same vHyLink: whether existing a visual link is directed
to the same hyperlink in an email.
5) greetings: whether an email contains greeting line.
6) signature whether an email contains signature at the end.
7) html content: whether an email contains HTML content.
8) script: whether an email contains javescript and other
scripts.
9) table: whether an email contains tables.
10) image: number of images in an email.
11) link: number of hyperlink in an email.
12) form: wether an email contains form.
13) fake tags: number of faketages in a email.
1Some phishing emails contain only image
Fig. 2. Feature selection using modified global k-mean
By implementing the algorithms described in Figure 3 (Sec-
tion IV), we identified thirteen useful orthographic features as
shown in Table I. Most of the features are self-explanatory. The
“script” feature indicates whether an email contains any script,
while the “fake tags” indicate the number of fake tags in the
email. The “greetings” indicates whether an email contains
a greeting line such as “Dear customer” or “Dear User”.
The “signature” indicates the content at the end of an email,
including “Copyright” or “ABN Number” of a bank which
to be used to make the email is more likely coming from a
legitimate organization.
Figure 1 shows an example of phishing email delivered on
18th May 2006. The email contains a logo, a greeting line,
text content, a hyperlink, signature, etc. We discovered that
the hidden link of the visible hyperlink are different. We have
also identified other useful features such as blackword list,
dot points, paragraph, and warning, that are useful in phishing
email prediction and phishing email clustering with structural
features.
B. Document presentation and feature normalization
After features are defined, we developed a set of methods
to extract all thirteen possible useful features from each email.
Let D = {d1, d2, . . . , d|D|} denote all the documents and
V = {v1, v2, . . . , v|V |} be the feature vector space. Where
|D| and |V | are the number of document and size of feature
vector respectively. Let aij be the value of jth feature of ith
document. Therefore, the presentation of each document is
Ai = (ai1, ai2, . . . , ai|V |), and each document is A = {aij}
where i = 1, 2, . . . , |V |; j = 1, 2, . . . , |D|.
The values of all features are numerical but in a different
range. For example, the size of a document could be thousands
byte while the number of images may be under five. To treat
all the original features as equally important, the value of each
feature needs to be normalized before the clustering process.
Feature values are normalized using the quotient of the actual
value over the maximum value among the feature so that
numerical values are limited to the range [0, 1].
Let bij be the value of jth normalized feature of ith doc-
ument, bij =
aij
max{akj , k = 1, 2, . . . , |D|} , the ith document
bi = (bi1, bi2, . . . , bi|V |), all the documents are represented as
B = {bij}. The normalized feature values are shown in Table
I.
Name of Feature Normalized Values
size of email [0..1]
text content 0 or 1
vlinks [0..1]
same vHyLink 0 or 1
greetings 0 or 1
signature 0 or 1
html content 0 or 1
script 0 or 1
table [0..1]
image [0..1]
links [0..1]
form 0 or 1
fake tags [0..1]
TABLE I
ORTHOGRAPHIC FEATURES
IV. FEATURE SELECTION
Feature collection gives us a set of possible orthographic
features. However, not every feature is effective as a discrimi-
nator for the purposes of provenance determination. Therefore,
it is necessary to select a relevant subset from the feature set
upon which to focus our attention, while ignoring the rest. The
problem of feature selection is that of finding a subset of the
original features of a data set, such that an iteration algorithm
which runs on data containing only these features generates a
cluster with the highest possible accuracy. Meanwhile, all the
clusters are also identified.
As described in Section III-A, the length of the orthographic
representation is not large. Therefore, the purpose of feature
selection in this work is to increase the quality of the feature
vector for better discrimination and reduce noise rather than
dimensionality reduction.
Input: All possible features V = {v1, v2, . . . , v|V |}, phishing emails D = {d1, d2, . . . , d|D|}
Output: Optimized set of features Vˆ = {vˆ1, vˆ2, . . . , vˆVˆ }
Number of clusters, Cluster C
begin
pre-precessing: M = {m1,m2, . . . ,m|V |} = {0, 0, . . . , 0}
for all Di ∈ D do
for all fj ∈ F do aij = fj(Di), mj = max(aij ,mj); end;
end;
for i = 1 .. |V | do
for j = 1 .. |D| do bij = aijmj ; end;
end;
graphing: for all tolerance ti ∈ [u1, u2], step δ do
Object function ob = 0;
for all Bi ∈ B do
run modified global k-means over bi = {bi1, bi2, . . . , bi|V |};
generate cluster Ci1, Ci2, . . . , Cili ;
ob = ob+ Σlip=1Σ
|V |
q=1||Cip − biq||;
end;
plot ob and ti in to objective function graph G;
end;
selection Vˆ = V, V¯ = Φ;
for all vi ∈ V do
run the graphing process in V − vi over B − bTi
generate cluster Ci1￿ , Ci2￿ , . . . , Cil￿i and objective function obi;
plot obi and ti in to objective function graph Gi together with G;
if obi > ob then Vˆ = Vˆ vi, V¯ = V¯ ∪ vi; end
end;
evaluation run graphing process based on Vˆ over Bˆ to
generate cluster C￿ = C￿1, C￿2, . . . , C￿Vˆ and objective function obVˆ ;
plot obVˆ and ti as graph GVˆ
if ob > obVˆ then output Vˆ and C
￿;
otherwise
for all vi ∈ V¯ do
end;
end
Fig. 3. Feature selection algorithm using iteration; mi is the maximin value of each feature; F represent all the feature extraction methods; u1 and u2 are
the upper and lower boundary of ti; |Bˆ| < |B| where Bˆ is the matrix using selected features only
The feature selection approach is shown in Figure 2. Ac-
cording to our approach, the feature collection and selection by
means of an algorithm enclosing the chosen iteration algorithm
- the modified global k-mean [2], [3].
Modified global k-means (MGKM) is an advanced ver-
sion of the global k-means algorithm and k-means algorithm
which is especially effective for solving clustering problems.
Traditionally, k-mean algorithms randomly select instances as
starting points to identify centroid of the given number of
cluster. The computation is very expensive on large datasets.
MGKM algorithm builds clusters starting from one centroid
and iteratively adds one centroid at a time. An auxiliary cluster
function is the key technique in MGKM which is minimized
to find starting point for the next centroid. In particular, every
starting point of new centroid (other than the first centroid) is
detected using previous iterations.
Our algorithm conducts the search for an optimized feature
subset using the modified global k-means for the evaluation of
the current feature subset. It is run repeatedly on the phishing
emails using various feature subsets and various tolerance
values. The performance is estimated by objective functions
using various feature subsets, where the subset with the lowest
objective values is chosen as the iterated feature subset on
which the induction algorithm runs.
Figure 3 illustrates the algorithm for selecting features. The
algorithm can be divided into three components: graphing,
comparison and evaluation.
1) We start with clustering emails D over all the possible
feature set V collection. The modified global k-means
algorithm generates clusters C and the clusters are
estimated with an objective function ob value over a
wide range of tolerances from 0.0001 to 0.1.
2) We then repeat the previous process with one feature
less at a time, totally |V | times. Again the modified
global k-means algorithm generates clusters Ci where
i = 1, 2, . . . , |V |, and an objective function value obi
for each feature removed. By comparing obi and ob we
are able to identify features less important in clustering.
Meanwhile, both informative features Vˆ and the possible
insignificant feature sets V¯ are identified, where the V¯
contains a small number of features.
3) Finally, we estimate the selected features and identify
Fig. 4. Performance comparison of original feature set and each feature removed at once from it - values of objection function vs number of clusters
the optimal cluster using the comparison of the objective
function value among different datasets. We apply the
modified global k-means algorithm to Vˆ to generate
the objective function value ob|Vˆ |. Vˆ is considered as
the target vector if ob|Vˆ | performs better than ob|V |.
Otherwise, we add features in V¯ back to Vˆ to repeat the
iteration process. One of the feature in V¯ is added back
to Vˆ at once in the first round, then any two features of
V¯ in the second round, until |V | − 2 features left. We
generate the objective function value for each case, and
identify the best feature sets Vˆ eventually.
The larger the dimensionality is, the bigger the value of
the objective function should be. A feature is considered as
a good discriminator when values of the objective function
are approximately the same when the feature is included and
excluded in clusters.
It is worth noting that the original feature set |V | is not large,
and the insignificant feature set V¯ is rather small. Therefore,
the process of step 3 is not time consuming.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section provides a comprehensive evaluation of text
clustering and its feature selection. The data used in our ex-
periment are the phishing emails collected from an Australian
financial institution over five months. We have used a total of
2048 documents without any pre-defined knowledge about the
documents.
We have fully implemented the algorithms described in
Section III and Section IV. We used Java for document
processing and MatLab for the learning process and plotting.
The experiment is designed to illustrate the effectiveness and
the reliability of the algorithm. The evaluation is designed as
three major steps.
Step 1: Initial cluster generation
For the experiment, the emails were presented with a
normalized matrix according to the description in Section III.
Then the modified global k-means algorithm was executed
using different tolerance values, ranging from 0.0001 to 0.1.
For each different tolerance value, the different clusters and
values of their objective functions are generated. Because the
clusters and the values of the objective function are generated
using all the features collected, we named them as initial
clusters and initial values of the objective function.
Step 2: Feature elimination
We repeated the same procedure of Step 1 with a smaller
feature set: each features is removed one at a time. For each
run, we gained the same types of results as in Step 1.
The results of the experiments Step 1 and Step 2 are
summarized in Figure 4 and 5 that plots values of the objective
function vs the number of clusters shown in 4 and values of
the objective function vs tolerance values shown in 5. The
experimental results show the impact of that each individual
feature causes.
Figure 4 describes the relationship between the values of
the objective function over different numbers of clusters. The
thick line represents the initial cluster, and the other dash
lines represent another thirteen clusters when one feature was
removed at a time from the original feature vector space.
Figure 5 describes the relationship between the values of
objection over different tolerance values. Notation are used
Fig. 5. Performance comparison of original feature set and each feature removed at once from it - values of the objective function vs tolerance values
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Comparison of the values of objection function vs number of clusters (a) example of a bad feature (b) example of a good feature
here same as in 4 to denote the experiment over different
feature spaces.
An interesting observation from Figure 4 and 5is that 4 gains
lower objective function values when a feature is removed, at
the same time 5 gains lower objective function values as well.
The cluster and tolerance show strong support to each other
so that the cluster and feature selection process are sound.
Figure 6 is a sub-figure of Figure 4 which contains the
comparison of the original clusters and clusters with one
feature removed. It is observed that with some removal of
features (such as “Feature 2:text content”, shown in 6 (a) the
value of the objective function decreased considerably and
more clear clusters are obtained. This indicates that these
features like Feature 2 cause more noise and confusion for
the clustering and they are considered as redundant features.
Figure 6 (b) shows that after the removal of Feature 10
(number of image in an email), the value of the objective
function remains the same as the original value which indicates
that Feature 10 plays an important role in the clustering.
An investigation into the original dataset revealed that in
most cases, Feature 2 has a zero value, therefore, removing
such feature results in a lower value of the objective function.
For another example, fake tags and its property are important
features to identify a phishing email, since 89% from our data
set the visible address are different from the invisible address
to users.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7. (a) and (b) are the performance comparison of selected features and original features; (c) and (d) are the performance comparison of removed features
and original features in terms of values of objection function vs number of clusters and values of the objective function vs tolerance values
Step 3: Final cluster generation
Five features were considered as ambiguous in the feature
selection process and were removed and eight features were
selected. Clustering using the modified global k-means algo-
rithm was applied on the selected features. Tolerance values
from 0.0001 to 0.1 as before were taken into account and the
clusters formed were recorded.
Figure 7 (a) and (b) show the values of the objective
function based on selected features were substantially lower
than on the original dataset. This indicates that more compact
clusters were produced on the new dataset than on the original
one.
We have also carried our experiment over the removed
features as shown as in Figure 7 (c) and (d). Though the
dimensionality of this feature set is lower than the selected
one, the values of the objective function (c) are much larger
than the selected one (a). (a) shows eleven clusters but (c)
does not provide any good indication. The performance over
the tolerance (d) behaves poorly compared to the performance
in (b). The figures here shows again that the feature selection
process is comprehensive.
In all the cases, the tolerance and the values of the objective
function are in a positive relationship. The tolerance graph 6
(b) shows the improvement of clustering on selected features.
However, the objective function values and number of clusters
are in a negative relationship. In the evaluation point of view,
the lower the objective function values are relatively, the more
efficient the clustering is. The graph helps us to determine a
sharp trend which indicates a “treat-in” point of increasing
clusters and decreasing values of the objective function, after
which the change was almost minimal and consistent. This
sharp bend corresponds to approximately 11 clusters. Hence,
our preliminary investigation of results revealed that there
will be 11 different clusters. Again, 6 (a) shows its support
of having 11 clusters since after 11 clusters the values of
the objective function are rather consistent. This leads us to
the conclusion on the number of possible profiles from the
structural analysis of the phishing emails.
Finally, the advantages clearly shown in the experimental
results are (1) the efficiency of the automatic feature selection
process (2) strong indication of correct clusters, and (3)
tolerance and clusters support each other as expected.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach to cluster
phishing emails using orthographic features for the purpose
of provenance determination. The contribution of the work
mainly consists of an evaluation method for the unsupervised
task of clustering, usage of orthographic features and the
learning algorithms.
Usage of orthographic features Most current information
retrieval and categorized systems focus on text features. How-
ever, terms are largely similar in the same type of documents,
therefore, they are not proper discriminators. On the other
hand, orthographic features reflect the author’s styles and
habit, so that the features are more informative than text
features in same type of documents. Experimental results
carried out in this work show that orthographic features play an
important role. In addition, low dimensionality is an advantage
of orthographic features because we only need to increase
the feature quality without considering the dimensionality
reduction. Low dimension also guarantees a fast process.
Learning algorithm We have developed an algorithm to
cluster documents and remove redundant features at the same
time. We utilized the modified global k-means method re-
peatly over different datasets and identified redundant features.
Experimental results show that a set of clear clusters are
generated after the redundant features are removed compared
with any other cases. Experimental evaluation on a large
number of computations demonstrates that our clustering and
feature selection techniques are highly effective and achieve
reliable results.
Evaluation Methodologies Evaluation is always a chal-
lenging issue in text clustering because of the automation
and lack of supervision. We have developed a comprehensive
method to show the confidence for clusters generated with our
algorithm. A number of experimental results show that the
values of the objective function over the number of clusters
and tolerance provide strong indications of the actual clusters.
Simultaneously, the algorithm evaluates the goodness of using
objective functions and proving that over a subset of good
features.
While these results are impressive, there remain further
possibilities for refining the approach. For example, the work
presented in this paper focuses on content of emails because
the content is the most complex part. It may be possible
to analyse the headings of emails which are well structured
to enhance the confidence of the clustering. We also intend
to cluster phishing emails in another way: using the email
structural presentation in terms of paragraphs, links, tables and
their sequences. According to the preliminary investigation of
results in this paper, there will be 11 phishing provenance,
therefore studying the characteristics of each provenance will
form the basis for future research.
One of the findings of Global Phishing Survey [13] by
APWG (May 2009) is that phishers are increasingly using
subdomain services to host and manage their phishing sites.
We intend to parse and analyse URLs particularly Top-Level
Domains (TLDs), subdomain, develop patterns to represent
the URLs. Such patterns can be used in phishing detection
and clustering.
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